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Some initial consideration of the work of Weber and Habermas is necessary to contextualise 
Lyotard’s contribution to debate on legitimation. 
 
In a speech delivered at the University of Munich in 1918 – “Politik als Beruf” (Politics as a 
vocation) - published in 1919, and subsequently re-published posthumously in his Gesammelte 
Politische Schriften (Collected Political Works) in 1921, Max Weber argued that “If the state is 
to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be”  (Weber, ed. 
Gerth & Wright Mills, 1948, 78).  He proceeded to ask: ‘why do men obey?’.  He distinguished 
between the ‘inner justifications’ leading men to obey and the ‘external means’ adopted to 
enforce domination.  The former can be regarded as types of legitimacy, and the latter as 
mechanisms of legitimation.  Weber famously suggested three types of legitimacy, which he 
called ‘traditional’, ‘charismatic’, and ‘legal’. Whatever type of legitimacy might justify 
domination in any society at any time, Weber argued that continuous domination has to be 
maintained by administrations whose loyalties are enforced.  Although Weber sought to 
articulate an explanatory model which might be universally applicable, his specific concern was 
with the analysis of developments in Germany.  Whereas his model assumed that legitimated 
leaders used administrations to maintain their domination, he considered that, in the rational-
legal state of his day, the leaders had undermined the autonomy of their administrators such that 
legitimation per se had marginalised the originally social grounds of legitimacy. 
 
For Weber, modern political organisation is based on legal authority.  Discussing the same 
formal circumstances in relation to religious organization, Weber argued that, in our modern 
situation, a leader or official never exercises his power “in his own right;  he holds it as a trustee 
of the impersonal and ‘compulsory institution’” (Weber, ed. Gerth & Wright Mills, 1948, 295).  
Weber’s definition of the modern situation corresponded with what Habermas was to describe as 
that of the modern bourgeois state.  Habermas’s Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit (The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.  An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society) was first published in 1962.  It was a socio-historical account of the way in which, in 
the 18th Century and, particularly in Britain, the traditional authority of the monarch, which was 
the legacy of feudal society, was controlled by the institution of  a parliament representing the 
new bourgeoisie.  His Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus of 1973 (published in English 
translation in 1976 as Legitimation Crisis and in French in 1978 as Raison et légitimité [reason 
and legitimacy] extended historically the earlier discussion so as to consider social organization 
in ‘capitalist’ and ‘post-capitalist’ societies, with a view to speculating whether the examination 
of crisis tendencies ‘in late- and post-capitalist class societies’ might disclose ‘possibilities of a 
“post-modern” society …’ (Habermas, 1976, 17).  Habermas suggested that ‘advanced 
capitalism’ is of a different kind from the ‘competitive capitalism’ or ‘liberal capitalism’ which 
operated within and between political states.  Systemically, ‘advanced capitalism’ operates 
independently of state rgulation except when malfunctions occur causing states to ‘intervene in 
the market’ (Habermas, 1976, 33).  Habermas argued that the ‘re-coupling the economic system 
to the political’ in times of crisis ‘creates an increased need for legitimation’ (Habermas, 1976, 
36) and he devoted the third part of his book (On the Logic of Legitimation Problems) to 
consideration of the consequences of alternative views of the ‘relation of legitimation to truth’ – 
whether, in effect, force majeure, legitimacy and legitimation coincide or whether ‘every 
effective belief in legitimacy is assumed to have an immanent relation to truth’ (Habermas, 
1976, 97). 
 
This is the immediate context for Lyotard’s consideration of legitimation in La condition 
postmoderne:  rapport sur le savoir (Lyotard, 1979) [The Postmodern Condition:  A Report on 
Knowledge (Lyotard, 1984)].  As its sub-title indicates, Lyotard’s book was concerned with the 
nature of knowledge within post-modern society.  He did not dissent from Habermas’s 
characterisation of the historical progress of Western social, political and economic organisation, 
but he differed from Habermas in refusing to accept that legitimation had to be either the 
consequence of a process of sociological/social-psychological acceptance or of rationally 
grounded truth claims.  As Lyotard says of legitimation, specifically contrasting himself with 
Habermas, “…I use the word in a broader sense than do contemporary German theorists in their 
discussions of the question of authority” (Lyotard, 1984, 8).  Lyotard’s concern was more 
fundamentally epistemological and he argued that the kind of rationality invoked by Habermas 
to resolve legitimation problems was predicated on a view of ‘science’ that was no longer 
tenable.  Habermas’s recourse to rationality to resolve the legitimation crisis of ‘post-modern’ 
society involved the mobilisation of precisely the form of thinking which that society is in the 
process of superceding.  It involved reference to a redundant ‘grand narrative’ and wrongly 
sought to secure communicative consensus.  Lyotard’s contention was, rather, that we have to 
determine ‘whether it is possible to have a form of legitimation based solely on paralogy’ 
(Lyotard, 1984, 61) or scientific and linguistic pragmatics, and he concluded that, as a result of 
viewing legitimation pragmatically, we are now ‘in a position to understand how the 
computerization of society affects this problematic’ (Lyotard, 1984, 67). 
 
Lyotard explicitly stated that La condition postmoderne was the report of a ‘philosopher’.  As a 
philosopher, he was already wrestling specifically with the problem of the kind of ‘judgement’ 
which would be compatible with the demands of postmodern legitimation.  Following on from 
his attempt in Discours, figure (1971) to liberate aesthetic experience from the tyranny of 
cognition, and his attempt in Economie libidinale (1974) to characterise that liberated condition 
in a post-Freudian discourse, he attempted to find a way out of the alternative legitimacies 
proposed by Habermas through detailed scutiny of the work of Kant.  Whereas Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason and his Critique of Practical Reason had seemed to emphasize forms of a priori 
regulation of thought and action, Lyotard sought to show (notably in Au juste: conversations, 
1979, Le différend, 1983, “Judicieux dans le différend” in Derrida et al., La Faculté de juger, 
1985, and in Leçons sur l’analytique du sublime, 1991) that Kant’s Critique of Judgement 
represented a transition to a form of pragmatics, reconciling sensation and reason, which 
acceptably deployed aesthetic legitimation as a paradigm which could be deployed for all the 
kinds of legitimation needed in postmodern society. 
